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ABSTRACT 
 
In the present essay we introduce the concept of macroculture as a complex of mutually 
supporting values, norms and beliefs in various areas of human activity, like religion, war, 
politics, sports etc. in a model. Then, we analyse how some macrocultures that are favorable 
or the “precondition” for the emergence of democracy and institutions develop, in particular 
property rights that foster economic development. We analyze this for an extended period that 
covers Later Bronze Age to Archaic Greece (approximately 1250-510 BC), as being the 
historical case where such a macroculture favorable to democracy and stable property rights 
first emerged.  We argue that the nature of the Greek polytheist religion (12 gods) depicts a 
proto-democratic side of the ancient Greek society. We then provide a comparison of the 
Greek case, in relation to the other, mainly oriental societies, as far as the level of 
participation in decision making procedures of these societies is concerned. Our main findings 
indicate that during the last period of the Mycenaean world, as well as during the Geometric 
and Archaic age periods, the emergence of various elements of macroculture, in religion, 
warfare, sports and city-state environment evolved into similar proto-democratic values, 
leading thus to the establishment of democracy as a political phenomenon in Classical Greece, 
with Athens being the most well-known historical case.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the present essay we introduce the concept of macroculture in order to analyse the 
conditions that shape long run economic structural and political change. We examine as our 
case study Bronze Age and Archaic Greek religion in relation to property rights, democratic 
elements and a general set of values that favors economic change and growth and, related to 
it, the emergence of democracy.        
  The emergence of direct democracy in 6
th
 century B.C. Archaic Greece has been of 
continuing interest to philosophers, sociologists, historians and economists since at least the 
fourth century B.C. with Plato's Republic and Aristotle’s Politics. It had a negative 
connotation through much of history linked to the negative view cast on it by Plato and to a 
lesser extent by Aristotle till the 17
th
 century. Interest in democracy, seen in a favorable light 
this time, revived with the reemergence of some democratic forms of government throughout 
Europe as if the cases of thirteen century Swiss Confederation (after 1291), some medieval 
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cities in northern Italy like Florence (Greif, 2005: 771-775), were a series of statutory laws 
known as ‘the Ordinances of Justice’ was enacted between the years 1293 and 1295, and in 
southern Germany Augsburg.        
 Further introduction of proto-democracy was introduced during the 17
th
 century in 
England (after the “Glorious Revolution” of December 1688 established continuous 
Parliaments) and the United Provinces (Dutch Republic).
1
 This interest gained strength during 
the so called “Enlightenment” of the 18th century through the writings of Montesquieu, Locke, 
Rousseau, Voltaire, Hume, and in the 19
th
 century with James and John Stuart Mill etc, who 
were among the first prominent members of the classical economic thought. 
During recent decades analysis has focused also on the causal links between 
democracy (both representative and direct) and the economy, economic institutions and 
economic performance. In the present paper we will discuss the concept of macroculture, as 
an environment of religion, politics, war, economics etc. that shapes particular norms, rules, 
values and beliefs. Then, we will discuss how this set of values etc. that has emerged in one of 
the mutually interdepended and reinforcing elements of a macroculture is diffused into others, 
for example from the religious domain and war into the fields of politics and economics. 
            
 
2. Macroculture and a model of path dependence and change  
 
In this section we introduce, for the first time as far as we know, the concept of 
macroculture (taken over and adapted from organization theory) into institutional economics 
in order to analyse structural change. A “macroculture” encompasses the common values, 
norms and beliefs shared among members of a society or state.  In our adaptation of the term 
in economics and politics, macroculture has also a dynamic time characteristic, that of long 
term periods. As we will show in our case study, Bronze and Archaic Age period in Greece, 
the elements of macroculture take shape over time periods of decades to centuries.  
 Through these values, norms and beliefs, a macroculture guides actions and creates 
typical behaviour among independent entities, so that it coordinates their activities so that 
complex tasks may be completed (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1992, 1994; Jones et al. 1997). 
This happens in three ways:  1) By creating “convergence of expectations”. 2) By allowing 
for idiosyncratic language to summarize complex routines and information and 3) By 
specifying broad tacitly understood rules for appropriate actions under unspecified 
contingencies (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988; Williamson, 1991, 1975). The establishment 
of “communication protocols” follows.  
Jones et al. (1997) have applied this concept to firms, while Almond and Verba (1963) 
have written on “civic culture” as a shared set of beliefs among citizens. Putnam (1993) 
argues that democratic stability depends on specific forms of social organization and citizen 
values which he calls “civic traditions”. A similar line of argumentation (Granovetter, 
1992:35) maintains that a structural embeddedness is developed: e.g., firms develop 
connected mutual contacts to one another. This corresponds to the establishment of mutual 
links or networks. These interactions define values and norms and thus strengthen this 
interdependence, the macroculture. This is consistent with Lazaric (2011: 148), who claims 
                                                 
1 
The United Provinces (UP) were not a true democracy in today’s sense where universal voting rights for all 
citizens exist, nor was 17
th
 (and later) England and the United Kingdom after England’s union with Scotland in 
1707. But the UP had established some proto-democratic institutions, in the ‘federal level’ of the union, e.g. the 
election of the Estates General (the union’s “Parliament”) where each province had one vote and where 
unanimity was required for taking a decision on behalf of the Union as a whole. It has been aptly called a 
“democratic head on an oligarchic body”. For details of the politics and economics of the UP, see Kyriazis 
(2006) and references there in.  
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that “every recurrent interaction pattern in an organization may be hiding a potential routine” 
as well as with Vromen (2011), who labels these mutual values, norms and patterns of 
behavior as “routines” by depicting them as “multilevel mechanisms” that generate firm 
behavior. 
Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010) and Kyriazis and Paparrigopoulos (2011) have analyzed 
one aspect of macroculture, the emergence of a new type of warrior in Archaic Greece, the 
hoplite (named from his big round shield, the hoplon) and the new tactical formation, the 
phalanx, as coordination and cooperation mechanisms which give rise to specific mental 
attitudes, values and norms, even a specific language (e.g. clear commands for battle) and 
learning and knowledge. Even more, the new warship adopted during the early 5
th
 century by 
the Greeks, the trireme and the naval fleets, developed and fine-tuned the cooperation and 
coordination mechanism in the phalanx’s “customs” values and norms. The next issue is why 
and how these norms and values are diffused from one sector of the macroculture into 
another, making it a coherent whole. 
 We believe that the answer can be found in the theory of bounded rationality. Simon 
(1982, 1991) developed the theory of bounded rationality, which states that the mind has 
limitations, for example in its capacity to absorb and use new information. We are not totally 
“rational” in the sense of seeking to maximize utility or any other “ideal”. What we actually 
do in real life is try to reach a solution that satisfies us even if it is not the best possible one. 
We may even ignore the best possible one that would maximize utility. Simon calls this 
behavior “satisficing”. Satisficing enables us to find acceptable solutions with minimal 
expenditure of time and effort, thus reducing transaction costs (as eg. information costs).  
This is exactly how ‘macrocultures’ develop and are strengthened and this is what 
happened in ancient Greek city-states. The values and norms evolved in warfare through 
coordination and cooperation mechanisms, equality, cohesion, self-discipline and above all 
trust, representing a specific set of mind and morals, learning and knowledge were transferred 
from the military into the political field, where they became isegoria (equality of speech), 
isonomia (equality in front of the law) and homonoia (unanimity).
2
 Thus, to paraphrase the 4
th
 
century Athenian orator Demades, bounded rationality became the “cognitive glue” that held 
the various elements of a macroculture together into a coherent whole.
3
  
Let us now formalize the emergence of new macrocultures that lead to economic and 
political change in the long-run. In figure 1 the path dependence and change of macrocultures 
is shown. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic-structural change from one (old) macroculture to a 
different (new) one. 
 
where: 
 
om: (old macroculture): signifies the old macroculture, a system of norms, values and 
customs etc. that characterize the economic, social and political field of a state and associated 
institutions and organizations. 
 
nm: (new macroculture): signifies the emerging new macroculture, where new norms, values, 
customs etc. are being created, developed and diffused, so that over time a break with the old 
                                                 
2
 Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010) present a formal model using bounded rationality in order to explain path 
dependence and change. As far as we know Kyriazis and Metaxas, (2010) and Kyriazis and Paparrigopoulos 
(2011) address for the first time the issues of the emergence of macroculture, values and norms in a historical 
context, that of Ancient Greece and their influence on the emergence of democracy. 
3
 Demades actually called theorika (money paid to poorer Athenian citizens to enable them to watch the four 
days long theatrical contents, a form of public education) and ekkleisiastika (money paid to enable them to 
participate in the Assembly, about 40 days per year during the 4
th
 century. See Hansen (1999), the “glue of 
democracy” (Plut. Mor. 1070B). 
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path-macroculture is accomplished, and the state follows a new path. We consider curve nm 
following an exponential shape because when during each period the state follows the new 
path (nm), the probability of staying on the new path increases, and the probability of 
returning to the old path decreases, because during each subsequent step along the new path, 
the various elements of the new macroculture are being mutually reinforced and integrated 
into a whole. 
 
 
Figure 1. Transition from the old to the new macroculture 
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The model in Figure 1 can be described by two simple equations: 
 
m=om+nm•e(g(t)∙t)                                                                                                          (1) 
 
where:  
m: macroculture 
om: the old macroculture: the constant term  
nm: the new macroculture which predominates over time if  gt>0 
gt: the rate of change depending on the creation of new elements of macroculture and their 
speed of diffusion (adaptation by other sectors). 
 
 
A further elaboration could be made using equation (2). 
 
g(t)=f(k, d)                                                                                                                   (2) 
 
where:  
 
k: knowledge 
d: rate of diffusion (of the macroculture effect) 
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So, the ultimate format of the macroculture equation might be: 
m=om+nm•e f(k, d) •t                                                                                                                    (3)       
For instance, the conversion of the Mycenaean warlord’s assemblies we describe next 
via the Homeric Epics and the existing scholarship, lead to fully developed democratic 
participation assemblies, like that of ancient Athens. We can describe this rate of change of 
“learning” as depending on the rate of creation of new knowledge kt, and the rate of its 
diffusion d.  
 
 
3. Macroculture in pre-Classical Greece 
 
We turn now to the examination of a period between the Later Mycenaean to the 
Archaic Age in order to find if there was a regime of values and beliefs that promoted the 
gradual emergence of property rights and proto-democratic ideals. 
 
 
3.1 Property Rights 
 
Homer's Iliad (mid-8
th
 century B.C.) begins with, in today’s terminology, a major 
dispute about property rights between Agamemnon, king of Mycenae and supreme 
commander of the Achaean army and Achilles, king of Pthia and mightiest champion of the 
Greeks because the former violated the rights on “property” of a slave girl called Briseis, who 
had been attributed to Achilles (Il. 1, 161-171). Achilles does give his slave girl to 
Agamemnon, neither in good grace nor in fear of him, but because he does not want to split 
the unity of the Greeks. But, aggrieved feeling dishonoured, he withdraws from the fight, 
which brings the Greeks great difficulties.  
From the above, it is clear that individuals (kings, aristocrats, and simple warriors) had 
property rights to the spoils of war (both humans and objects). These property rights served as 
incentives to motivate men to fight effectively (Frey and Buhofer, 1988). It seems that during 
the Trojan period these rights were clearly ascertained and denominated. Prisoners and objects 
were collected, and then distributed according to rules: First choice to the commander in chief 
(Agamemnon) and then in decreasing order according to merit and contribution to battle, thus 
second choice going to Achilles, the best warrior of all. It seems that during the Trojan period 
these rights were clearly ascertained and denominated. An extra series of passages (Il. 2. 210-
241; Il. 19. 181-189, 247-248; Il. 21. 101-102) prove that an environment of property rights 
was in existence to some extend during that time. 
 Homer's Odyssey also gives some information on property rights, that mainly have to 
do with the property of Queen Penelope and her son Telemachus and the attempt of a mob of 
other warlords from adjacent places near to Ithaka, to trespass it (see Od. 1. 160, 402-404; Od. 
2. 333-336). Odyssey gives some additional information on trade and the exchange of goods, 
which again presupposes the existence of clearly attributable property rights (Od. 1. 430-432; 
Od. 14. 100-105; Od. 17. 415-427; Od. 18. 356-364). 
Hesiod’s poems of about 750-720 BC also contain elements that depict an 
environment that more or less safeguards property rights on land (see Works and Days. 210-
224; 225-228; 248-255; 274-281). While Days and Works does not give us an idea of a clearly 
established law system, it gives an overall impression of an emerging macroculture of 
customs, norms and values regarding justice and property rights. During the next two 
centuries, linked to the emerging strength of the hoplite warrior-free farmer (Kyriazis and 
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Paparigopoulos, 2011) the principle of isonomia (equality in front of the law of all free 
citizens, and in parallel, written law and institutionalized courts of justice) will emerge and be 
supreme. Hesiod’s second poem, Theogony gives additional support to the value of justice 
(see Th. 881-884; 901-904).    
Apart from these classical texts of Homer and Hesiod, academic literature verifies the 
existence of an emerging system of property rights. Private property in land was protected by 
law, while a regime of leasing of land existed too. Women too had the right to hold land 
property, but only those who were holding ritual offices.
4
 
 
 
3.2 Democratic Elements 
  
Starting again from evidence in the Iliad, Homer informs us of the existence of a 
council of the Kings (Il. 1. 304-305, Il. 2. 51-56). More important as an indication of an 
emerging proto-democratic spirit, in Il. 2. 85-115, we have an assembly of all warriors. 
Agamemnon wants to have the assembly's approval about the war's continuation and puts 
forward arguments in favour. In Il. 2. 142-165 the assembly decides to continue the war, 
accepting Agamemnon's arguments and proposal.  And the above is not as isolated example. 
In Il. 2, 278-304 Odysseus steps forward in front of the warriors assembly, asking for patience 
followed by Nestor. The Trojans also have a similar assembly, as made clear in Il.2. 773-778 
when the goddess Iris finds them assembled. The practice of the gods mirrors the practice of 
men (or is it the other way round?). In Il l. 4. 1-19 the gods hold an assembly in order to 
decide what to do concerning the war.  
A series of other passages indicate the proto-democratic mentality of the Greek world, 
both in religion and politics (see. 1. 539-544; Il. 8. 489-497; 9. 9-18; 10. 196-253; 14. 61-75; 
19. 34-35, 42-45 and 45-153; Il. 20. 4-25). Lastly, the incident with Thersites, an Achaean 
warrior of non-noble origin who accuses the warlord Agamemnon of trespassing Achilles 
property has been noticed by a series of scholars such as Ferguson (1973:11), who believes 
that “Thersites, cruelly caricatured and ruthlessly manhandled, is the beginning of a 
democratic opposition to aristocratic misuse of power”. Kyriazis and Economou (2012) argue 
that the incident with Thersites is an example relatively similar to the process of free speech 
in front of an assembly, what would become in the classical period, the principle of isegoria 
(equality of speech), one of the founding values of direct democracy whereas de Romilly 
(1999: 38-39) argues that men are portrayed as having free will to behave as they wish.  
Odyssey offers traces of democratic values during the Mycenaean period too (Od. 1. 
80-95, 272-275, 371-372; 2. 6-21; 17. 307-487) mainly focusing on the assembly of the 
people of Ithaka. The same picture, which reveals the social values and believes of the 
Hellenic pre-Classical world, is also verified by the behavior of gods: Through the passages of 
both Iliad and Odyssey, The 12 gods, discuss and decide democratically through assembly 
gatherings. 
Some scholars believe that these war assemblies that included both a king and a 
council were primarily consultative to the Achaean Kings (Congleton, 2011; Pitsoulis, 2011). 
However, the variety of the examples of proto-democratic’ procedures we have already 
described here make us believe that, although Mycenaean war assemblies were not 
structurally similar in nature to the Greek democratic assemblies from the 6
th
 to the 3
th
 B.C. 
Classical period and predominantly that of Athens, they can certainly  be described as 
“precursors” of the Athenian classical assembly. 
 
                                                 
4
 For an analytical view of the property rights regime in pre-classical Greece see Kyriazis and Economou (2012) 
and the references given there. 
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4. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
By analyzing the main literary texts of the 8
th
 century we have traced two elements of 
the emerging democratic macroculture, in religion considering property rights securitization 
(the principles of isonomia- equality in front of the law) and participation in decision making 
(isegoria- freedom and equality of speech) in front of the assembly, either of warriors (Iliad) 
or citizens (the people) in the Odyssey.  
Thus, religious beliefs and actual practices of Mycenaean and Archaic periods are one 
element in forming values, norms and customs of a macroculture favorable to the emergence 
of democracy. In Kyriazis and Paparrigopoulos (2011) a different element of macroculture 
was analyzed, that of the emerging (again during the Archaic period) heavy infantryman 
hoplite and the phalanx formation. There too, the egalitarian element was predominant. 
Kyriazis and Economou (2012) argue that sports had a major role in the emergence of 
democracy in Classical Greece through the existence of a macroculture environment.  
In Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010) and Kyriazis (2012), a different element of 
macroculture was analyzed, that of the emerging (again during the Archaic period) heavy 
infantryman, the hoplite and the phalanx formation. There too, the egalitarian element was 
predominant. Our argument thus is that probably even during the Mycenaean period, but more 
certainly during the Archaic, there were different elements, in religion (concerning property 
rights and democratic values), warfare but also in the athletic games
5
, that all evolved into 
similar values and norms, of equality, justice, freedom of speech, safeguarding of property 
rights and individualism.  
 These values in religion, warfare but also in the athletic games were being 
continuously developed during the Archaic Age in Greece, as can be glimpsed also in the 
poets of the period. Figure 1 shows that the various elements of the macroculture coalesced 
into a coherent whole by the end of the Archaic period, forming the basis for the emergence of 
democracy. The cycles represent the various elements of a new macroculture that emerge in 
one sector at time period 1, thus representing new potential democratic knowledge in 
“politics” and the emergence and gradual enforcement of individual property rights. These 
cycles are reinforced through diffusion to other sectors at periods 2 and 3, and have been 
integrated into a new mutually supporting macroculture at period 4 (through diffusion d - see 
equation 2).  
Our argument thus is that probably even during the Mycenaean period, but more 
certainly during the Archaic, there were different elements, in religion, warfare but also in the 
Athletic Games, that all evolved similar values and norms, of equality, justice, freedom of 
speech, safeguarding of property rights and individualism. These values in religion, warfare 
but also in the Athletic Games are being continuously developed during the Archaic Age in 
Greece, as can be glimpsed also in the poets of the period (Schefold, 1992; Pitsoulis, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Kyriazis and Economou (2013) offer an extended analysis of how athletic values in pre-Classical Greece 
affected the emergence of democracy during the 5
th
 century BC in Greece, with Athens being the most 
characteristic case. 
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Figure 2. Decision Tree and Integration of Various Elements of Macroculture 
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